Can labour regulation hinder economic performance? Evidence from India by Besley, Timothy & Burgess, Robin
 
Can Labour Regulation Hinder Economic 
Performance? Evidence from India* 
 
by 
 
Timothy Besley 
and 
Robin Burgess 
 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
`   The Suntory Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for 
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
DEDPS 33   London WC2A 2AE 
February 2002  Tel.: (020) 7955 6674 
 
 
*  We are grateful to Roli Asthana, Abhijit Banerjee, Rohini Pande, Andrei Shleifer, Michael 
Smart, Chris Udry and seminar participants at Harvard/MIT, Yale and LSE for useful 
comments and suggestions. Berta Esteve-Volart, Shira Klien, Silvia Pezzini, Pataporn 
Sukontamarn and Kamakshya Trivedi provided excellent research assistance. The first draft 
of the paper was written while Burgess was visiting MIT Economics Department which he 
wishes to thank for support and encouragement. We thank STICERD for financial support. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper investigates whether the industrial relations climate in Indian 
States has affected the pattern of manufacturing growth in the period 1958-92.  
We show that pro-worker amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are 
associated with lowered investment, employment, productivity and output in 
registered manufacturing. Regulating in a pro-worker direction is also 
associated with increases in urban poverty. This suggests that attempts to 
redress the balance of power between capital and labour can end up hurting 
the poor. 
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1 Introduction
One of the key challenges of development economics is to identify policies
that harm or hinder growth, along with an assessment of their eﬀectiveness
in poverty reduction. Traditional views of the growth process put develop-
ment of manufacturing at centre stage in the structural change accompany-
ing economic development.1 A casual look at the performance of some of the
more successful Asian economies after 1960 adds credence to this view. For
example, between 1960 and 1995, manufacturing as a share of GDP grew
from 9 percent to 24 percent of GDP in Indonesia, 8 percent to 26 percent in
Malaysia and 12.5 percent to 28 percent in Thailand. All of these countries
had strong overall growth performances and saw significant falls in absolute
poverty.
In contrast, the Indian economy did not experience a significant expan-
sion of manufacturing as a share of national income. Manufacturing output
constituted 13 percent of GDP in 1960 (ahead of the countries listed above)
but grew to only 18 percent of GDP by 1995. India’s overall growth over this
period was also relatively modest and did not exhibit the extent of declining
absolute poverty experienced elsewhere in Asia. While this pattern reflects
a complex array of phenomena, a key issue concerns the way in which policy
choices can be identified as playing a role.
This paper studies the role of labor market regulation in explaining the
performance of Indian manufacturing between 1958 and 1992. There are four
reasons for this focus. First, labor market regulations have frequently been
cited in explaining India’s poor growth performance [see, for example, Dollar,
Iarossi and Mengitsae 2001, Stern 2001 and Sachs, Varshey and Bajpai 1999].
The charge is that granting excessive bargaining power to organized labor
blunted investment incentives and gave India a generally unfavorable business
climate. Second, in the Indian constitution labor regulation is in part under
the control of the states. This means that diﬀerent parts of India faced
diﬀerent regulatory climates. This gives rise to both time series and cross-
sectional variation that can be used to identify its eﬀects. Third, regulation
applies to a specific sector — registered manufacturing — which provides a
focus for studying its impact. Fourth, the choice of period is opportune as
it extends from the heyday of central planning in the late 1950s to the onset
of liberalization in 1992. Whilst there was some dismantling of planning
1See, for example, Kaldor [1967] for an early forcefull statement of this view.
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structures during this period manufacturing remained highly protected from
international competition. This helps us to isolate the impact of domestic
policies on industrial performance.
Between 1958 and 1992 manufacturing grew by 3.3 percent in India as
a whole. This, however, masks significant variations across states. For
example, West Bengal which was the largest producer of manufactured out-
put per capita at the beginning of the period had fallen to seventh in 1992
with output per capita falling at an average rate of 1.5 percent per annum.
West Bengal was also a state that had the greatest body of pro-worker labor
regulation passed in the state legislature. Its performance contrasts with
Andhra Pradesh which grew at nearly 6 percent per year over the same pe-
riod but which experienced anti-worker labor regulation. Here, we develop
an econometric analysis of whether the patterns of regulation can account
for the cross-state variation in patterns of manufacturing performance over
time. The analysis is consistent with the view that pro-worker labor reg-
ulation resulted in lower growth of manufacturing output, investment and
employment. Regulating in a pro-worker direction also resulted in lower
rates of poverty reduction over the period.
Our data on labor regulation come from looking at state amendments
to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. While the act was passed at the
central level, state governments were given the right to amend it under the
Indian Constitution. We read the text of each amendment (121 in all) and
classified each as pro-worker, pro-employer or neutral. This gave a sense of
whether workers or employers benefited or whether the legislation had no
appreciable impact on either group. The results are interpreted through the
lens of a simple two-sector model of incomplete contracts where firms invest
in capital ahead of bargaining with labor over the surplus.
The paper illuminates long-standing debates about the role of the state
in promoting or hindering economic development. While there is now an
abundance of cross-country evidence on determinants of growth, relatively
little of this identifies robust relationships with policy regimes. Moreover,
there is the inevitable diﬃculty of identifying the true sources of variation in
a predominantly cross-sectional context. The relatively long time period (35
years) and the fact that so much of the policy environment is common to the
Indian states makes it an ideal testing ground for the eﬀects of regulation on
output and welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we review the literature on regulation and economic performance. In section
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three we trace the evolution of labor market regulation in India, detail how
we capture the direction of regulatory change and examine how economic
performance has varied across diﬀerent states. In section four, we set out
a simple two sector model in which aﬀecting the bargaining power of labor
aﬀects the pattern of employment and capital accumulation in an economy.
The model is based on incomplete contracts between labor and capitalists.
Section five contains the empirical analysis of the eﬀect of labor regulation on
manufacturing performance. Section six turns to the welfare consequences
of regulation in terms of poverty reduction and section seven concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a significant literature on cross-country growth, much of which has
tried to study how policies impact on economic performance [see Barro, 1997].
Few simple and definitive lessons about the role of the state have emerged
from this. In early cross-country growth work, government activism was of-
ten proxied crudely by some measure of the size of the state [see Temple, 1999
for a review]. However, the results tend not to be robust and conceptually,
it is not clear whether this captures anything interesting from a theoretical
point of view. Hall and Jones [1999] provides one of the most compelling
eﬀorts at identifying the eﬀect of government on growth by developing an in-
dex of social infrastructure reflecting a broad range of government activities
such as contract enforcement, bureaucratic quality and government repudia-
tion of contracts. In OLS and IV specifications, they find that good social
infrastructure is positively related to growth.
Looking at policies directly is notoriously diﬃcult given that the details of
government intervention vary strongly across countries. An important and
innovative contribution in this vein is the recent paper by Djankov et al [2002]
which looks at regulations governing the start of businesses in a cross-section
of 85 countries.2 This is a potentially important way of measuring regulatory
severity cross-sectionally. They find that countries with higher regulation
of entry have less impressive performance across an array of social, political
and economic indicators. Of particular note in relation to this study, they
find that greater regulation expands the size of the unoﬃcial economy. They
argue that this is in line with a public choice view of regulation as being put
2In the context of our study it is interesting to note that India is close to average in
this dimension. Moreover, it is ranked above Indonesia and Japan.
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in place by oﬃcials or insiders intent on extracting rents (see, for example,
Stigler [1971], De Soto [1989], and Shleifer and Vishny, [1998]).
Our focus is on labor market regulations. This is related to studies
of how economic performance has varied among OECD economies which
have frequently cited labor market institutions as a determinant of economic
performance [see Freeman, 1988; Blanchard, 2000; Lindbeck and Snower,
2001]. Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] which builds on Nickell [1997] consider
how observable shocks interact with institutions in explaining the evolution
of European unemployment. While institutions are fixed cross-sectionally,
interacting them with time-varying regressors allows their dynamic eﬀects to
be considered. They conclude that interacting shocks and institutions does
a good job at accounting for the variation in unemployment across Europe.
Nickell and Layard [2000] argue that, for European countries, labor market
institutions such as unions and social security systems are important drivers
of economic performance with strict labor market regulations, employment
protection and minimum wages playing a lesser role.
This work is also related to that which looks at whether the political
complexion of governments changes economic performance [see, for example,
Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, 1991]. This literature looks, for example, at
whether having left leaning governments in oﬃce lowers growth. We show
that the propensity of governments in India to pass labor regulations is a
function of political control and hence that they provide a mechanism by
which political history has a lasting eﬀect on economic performance.
The strategy of state led industrialization which India adopted at In-
dependence has meant that government policies have taken center stage in
trying to explain manufacturing performance up to the onset of liberalization
in 1992 [see Mookherjee, 1997]. Bhagwati and Desai [1970] discuss how the
requirement to obtain a license to set up a new unit or expand production
served as a barrier to entry and limited competition.3 The advisability of
closing oﬀ Indian industry behind a range of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers as
a means of promoting infant industries has also been the subject of heated
debate. Singh [1964] and Bhagwati and Srinivasan [1975] were early critics in
particular as regards the presumption of export pessimism. Bhagwati [1998]
points to the choice of an import substitution strategy over export promotion
as being a major reason as to why India did not experience a development
3This led to a ‘license raj’ where the benefits of industrialization became concentrated
in the hands of a few major firms.
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“miracle” of the type seen in various East Asian countries [see World Bank,
1993].
Central planning and trade protection, however, have limited scope in ex-
plaining cross-state variation in manufacturing performance over time. Here
notions of ‘business’ or ‘investment’ climate, which in part reflect state con-
trolled policies, take center stage. And these factors became increasingly
important over the 1958-1992 period as firms and capital become increas-
ingly mobile.4 Stern [2001] points to improvement of the investment climate
as being key to increasing productivity and reducing poverty and identifies
reform of India’s cumbersome labor regulations as a priority. Sachs, Varshey
and Bajpai [1999] echo this sentiment by pointing to restrictive regulations
on labor redundancy as being a key reason as to why India has done poorly
in terms of export performance. Using a cross-sectional survey of about one
thousand manufacturing establishments drawn from ten Indian states Dol-
lar, Iarossi and Mengitsae [2001] show that productivity is forty-four percent
lower in states judged by managers to have poor business climates. They
then break apart investment climate. Entrepreneurs were asked how much
of their labor force they would lay oﬀ if there was greater labor market flex-
ibility to capture the ‘cost’ of labor regulation.5 This factor alongside others
was found to be important in explaining cross-state diﬀerences in productiv-
ity.6 Fallon [1987] and Fallon and Lucas [1993] argue that strengthening job
security regulations through central government amendment of the Indus-
trial Disputes Act in 1976 and 1982 was associated with a reduction in labor
demand in firms covered by the regulation but not in small firms uncovered
by job security regulations. The stringency of employment protection reg-
ulation has thus been used to explain the phenomena of jobless growth in
industry in the 1980s whereby industrial output growth was accompanied by
stagnation in employment [see Bhalotra, 1998].
4Though radical liberalization only took place from 1992 onwards steps to relax and
dismantle central controls and regulations were being undertaken from the early 1970s [see
Mookherjee, 1997].
5The average figure was 16-17 percent.
6Other factors included power reliability, visits from government regulators, custom
clearance delays and internet connectivity.
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3 Institutional Background and Data
Our aim is to look at whether the direction of labor regulation aﬀects eco-
nomic performance across Indian states. As we note above, there is con-
siderable variation in economic performance which could have a variety of
explanations. The particular focus on labor regulation in this paper is moti-
vated by the observation that states retain a considerable degree of autonomy
in determining this unlike other forms of regulation. In addition, it is regu-
lation which targets a particular sector — registered manufacturing which is
comprised of firms with more than ten employees with power or more than
twenty employees without.7
3.1 Labor Regulation in India since Independence
Since Independence India has been a federal democracy. The Indian Con-
stitution of 1949 divides legislative powers into three lists — the Union List,
the State List and the Concurrent List. Central and state governments are
sovereign as regards making laws relating to matters in the Union and State
Lists, whereas both central and state governments can make law relating to
matters in the Concurrent List. While the Constitution did provide the states
with some jurisdiction over industrial development,8 these powers could be
overridden by central government powers. Specifically Entries 7, 52 and 54
of the Union List give the central government jurisdiction over defense in-
dustries and over other industries and mines when this is deemed to be in
the ‘public interest’. This public interest clause was invoked in the Industries
(Regulation and Development) Act of 1951 which eﬀectively granted central
government control over all key industries in India.
The situation as regards industrial labor was diﬀerent. Matters relating
to trade unions and industrial and labor disputes fall under the Concurrent
List (Entry No. 22). This implies that both central and state governments
are empowered to introduce legislation with respect to these matters. The
7This definition comes from the definition of a factory in the Factories Act of 1948. All
firms which fit this description have to register with Industrial Inspectorates in each state
and are surveyed on an annual basis by the Annual Survey of Industries. This implies
that we have detailed information on the functioning and performance of the registered
manufacturing sector across states and time.
8Entries 23, 24 and 27 of the State List authorize the states to regulate mines and
mineral development, industries and the production, supply and distribution of goods.
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key piece of central legislation relating to industrial disputes is the Indus-
trial Disputes Act of 1947 which sets out the conciliation, arbitration and
adjudication procedures to be followed in the case of an industrial dispute.
This Act has been extensively amended by state governments during the
post-Independence period. It is these amendments that we use to study
the impact of labor market regulation on manufacturing performance and
poverty.
The Industrial Disputes Act was designed to oﬀer workers in the orga-
nized sector some protection against exploitation by employers. This was in
contrast with labor legislation introduced prior to World War I which was
designed to limit labor rights and to protect the commercial interests of the
British.9 This Act, which is in forty sections, specifies the powers of gov-
ernment, courts and tribunals, unions and workers and the exact procedures
that have to be followed in resolving industrial disputes.10 It defines the
bargaining positions of the diﬀerent parties involved in an industrial dispute.
As noted above, state legislatures have the power to amend this act.
3.2 Coding Legislative Changes
Our eﬀort to measure the direction of policy in a state began by reading
the text of all state level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947
from Malik [1997]. Our reading of the individual amendments lead us to code
each one as either being neutral, pro- or anti-worker. While this method
9Political reforms introduced after the war and the fact that India had joined the
International Labor Organization in 1919 provided some impetus to protect the interests
of labor culminating in the Trade Union Act of 1926. Major strikes in 1928 involving
the cotton textile industry of Bombay, Tata Iron and steel workers and railway workers,
however, made it transparent that there was no eﬀective machinery for the settlement of
industrial disputes. (See Kannappan [1959] for an analysis of the Tata Steel strike.) The
Trade Disputes Act passed in 1929 which required unions to give 14 days notice prior to
strikes in public utility concerns and which prohibited strikes which might cause severe
hardships to the public and the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act passed in 1938 served as
precursors to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.
10Sections are arranged within seven chapters which cover (I) definitions; (II) authorities
under this Act, notice of change and reference of certain individual disputes to grievance
settlement authorities; (III) reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals; (IV)
procedures, powers and duties of authorities; (V) strikes and lockouts, lay-oﬀ and re-
trenchment, special provisions relating to lay-oﬀ, retrenchment and closure in certain
establishments, unfair labour practices; (VI) penalties and (VII) miscellaneous [see Malik,
1997].
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of classification required a number of judgement calls, we found surprisingly
few cases of uncertainty.11 We coded each pro-worker amendment as a one,
each neutral amendment as a zero, and each anti-worker amendment as a
minus one.
It is useful to give a couple of examples of this procedure. A sample pro-
employer reform is from Andhra Pradesh in 1987. Our synopsis is: “If in
the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient for securing
the public safety of the maintenance of public order or services or supplies
essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or
industrial peace in the industrial establishment it may issue an order which
(i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms and conditions of an
order and (ii) prohibits strikes and lockouts in connection with any industrial
dispute.” This amendment gets a code of minus one in our data. A sample
pro-worker reform is from West Bengal in 1980 where our synopsis is: “The
rules for lay-oﬀ, retrenchment and closure may according to the discretion of
the state government be applied to industrial establishments which employ
more than 50 workers. Under the central act, these rules only apply to
establishments which employ more than 300 workers.” This gets coded as a
plus one in our data.
Having obtained the direction of amendments in any given year, we cu-
mulated the scores over time to give a quantitative picture of the regulatory
environment as evolved over time. This is our basic regulatory measure
used below. In years in which there were multiple amendments, we use an
indicator of the general direction of change. So, for example, if there were
four pro-worker amendments in a given state and year, we would only code
this as plus one rather than plus four.
This method of analysis divides the states into “treatment” and “con-
trol” groups. The latter are states that do not experience any amendment
activity in a pro-worker or pro-employer direction over the 1958-1992 pe-
riod. There are six of these: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir,
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. Among those that have passed amendments,
our method classifies six states Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu as “pro-employer”. This leaves four
“pro-worker” states: Gujarat, Maharastra, Orissa and West Bengal. Figure
11Summaries of all amendments and their coding is available at
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staﬀ/rburgess/#wps.
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1 graphs the history of the regulatory structure across states over the period
in question. For the most part, changes are monotonic although states move
in diﬀerent directions.
For later reference, it is important to see that the Indian experience gives
important sources of both time-series and cross-sectional variation in regula-
tion. Finding comparable variation while being able to control for common
institutions is problematic even in OECD countries. The empirical analysis
will exploit the time-series dimension of change and will incorporate state
fixed eﬀects in the analysis.
3.3 Background Facts
Overall, non-agricultural output per capita in India accounts for 66 percent
of total output. Among non-agricultural output, on average manufacturing
is about 13 percent of total state output of which 9 percent is in registered
manufacturing. The share of registered manufacturing in total manufactur-
ing has increased over time from 50 percent to 65 percent over the period in
question.
Figures 2 and 3 give an idea of how economic performance in registered
manufacturing varies by Indian states. Figure 2 looks at registered manu-
facturing output per capita and Figure 3 at employment in registered man-
ufacturing over our data period for each of the sixteen states in our sample.
Certain states: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Ma-
harashtra show striking growth, while states like Assam, Jammu and Kashmir
and West Bengal display relative stagnation (albeit from very diﬀerent base
levels). Note that we have both pro-worker and pro-employer states among
the fast growers.
Table 1 breaks out certain state indicators by the type of regulatory
stance of the state. These show that the pro-worker states on average had
high registered manufacturing output in 1960 relative to control states and
pro-employer states. By 1990, there is no statistically significant diﬀerence
between pro-worker and pro-employer states. Moreover, the average regis-
tered manufacturing output in the pro-employer states has overtaken that in
the control states. This pattern is less pronounced when looking at over-
all output per capita. Other state characteristics such as total taxes per
capita, development expenditure per capita, installed electricity per capita
and literacy show no significant diﬀerence between treatment and control
states.
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4 The Model
We begin by laying out a theoretical model that links increases in bargaining
power with economic performance. The aim is to motivate the empirical
tests and to give some structure to the interpretation. However, it falls
short of providing a full blown dynamic general equilibrium model of the
Indian economy. We home in specifically on one sector — manufacturing,
supposing that it is embedded in a larger economy only through wages and
prices.
For the sake of realism in an Indian context, we allow for two manufac-
turing sectors: registered and unregistered. In line with the situation in
India, we assume that the defining diﬀerence between these sectors is scale.
Registered firms can be of any size, but are subject to government regulation
aﬀecting the way in which they bargain over wages. Unregistered firms are
unregulated, but are restricted in size to employ no more than L workers.12
All firms operate in a common set of factor markets for labor and capital
whose prices (w and r) they treat as parametric. For simplicity, we suppose
that firms all produce a common manufactured good.
A firm in either sector is characterized by ownership of a non-marketed
factor, such as a technology embedded in human capital, ownership of which
is distributed among an entrepreneurial class. For our purposes this could
be thought of as human capital or technology. We suppose that there is a
continuum of firms indexed by θ ∈
£
θ, θ
¤
. Production in a firm is θF (L,K)
where F (K,L) is a homogeneous production function satisfying the INADA
conditions and exhibiting decreasing returns to scale. Hence, owners of firms
enjoy a rent due to the scarcity of the factor embodied in θ. Prices of all
manufactured goods are normalized at one.
We assume that each firm must first decide whether to become registered
or unregistered (stage 0). Having made that decision, we assume that it
must decide how much capital to employ (stage 1). Having sunk the capital
investment, it then decides on how much labor to employ (stage 2) and
bargains with workers over rents. For simplicity, we focus on the case where
capital has no value if it is removed from production at stage 2.
We assume that owners of capital in unregistered firms have complete
bargaining power at stage 2 and hence capture all rents. (This is actu-
12As per the Factories Act of 1948 the cut-oﬀ for becoming registered is twenty employees
for firms without power and and ten with.
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ally stronger than we need as we explain below.) The firm then behaves
just like a standard firm where labor and capital hiring decisions equate the
marginal product to the price. The only restriction faced by an unregistered
firm is that the number of workers hired at stage 2 cannot exceed L. Let
πU
¡
r, w, θ;L
¢
be the conditional profit function in the unregistered sector.13
Turning now to the registered manufacturing sector, we assume there is
a well-defined pool of “inside” workers with whom the firm bargains if it
registers. (In reality, it is best to think of this as a union.) We assume
that contracts are incomplete along the lines described in Grout [1984] — any
contracts negotiated at the time of the capital accumulation decision are sub-
ject to renegotiation ex post, creating a hold-up problem.14 Following Grout
[1984], we use a generalized Nash bargaining solution with bargaining power
of firm owners being represented by α ∈ [0, 1]. Using his results, the equi-
librium payoﬀ to a firm owner in the unregistered sector is απR
¡
r
α , w, θ
¢
.15
The bargaining power of the firm enters now in two places — aﬀecting directly
the share of the rent that the firm owner receives and the “price” of installed
capital. Ex post bargaining ensures that labor is allocated eﬃciently at
13Formally, this is defined as:
πU
¡
w, r, θ, L
¢
= argmax
©
f (L,K)− rK −wL : L ≤ L
ª
14For a detailed macro-economic analysis of an economy with hold-up issues, see Ca-
ballero and Hammour [1998].
15The rents in the firm are distributed as:
argmax
L,T
{θF (K,L)−wL− T}α {T}(1−α)
where the threat point is assumed to be zero payoﬀs all round. The capital accumulation
decision solves:
αθFK (K,L) = r.
In this case it is as if the profit function being maximized is,
πR
³ r
α
, w, θ
´
= argmax
n
θF (K,L)− r
α
K −wL
o
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price w. However, because of the hold-up problem, more bargaining power
for workers raises the cost of capital to r/α > r. Thus less capital is installed
and less labor is also employed.16
Firms can choose one of three states: inactivity, being registered or un-
registered. A firm is inactive if it would make a loss no matter which sector
it operated in. It is now straightforward to determine the equilibrium size of
the registered sector.
Proposition 1 There are three possible cases:
1. For high enough L and low enough α all active firms are unregistered
2. For low enough L and high enough α all active firms are registered.
3. Otherwise, there exists a critical value bθ ¡α, L¢ which is decreasing in
α and increasing in L such that all firms with θ ≥ bθ ¡α, L¢ choose to register.
In this case, an increase in the bargaining power of labor reduces the size of
the registered manufacturing sector and increases the size of the unregistered
manufacturing sector (other things being equal).
Thus unless we are at one of the boundary cases (which is not empirically
the case in our data), then we expect the size of the registered manufacturing
sector to be larger in states that give greater bargaining power to owners of
firms. Total labor and capital used in the registered sector (assuming an
interior solution for bθ ¡α, L¢) are
LR =
Z θ
bθ(α,L) L
³ r
α
, w, z
´
dz and KR =
Z θ
bθ(α,L)K
³ r
α
, w, z
´
dz. (1)
Using these, it is straightforward to show the following empirical implication
of our model:
Proposition 2 An increase in the bargaining power of labor (i) reduces out-
put, capital formation and employment in the registered manufacturing sec-
tor; (ii) increases output in the unregistered manufacturing sector and (iii)
reduces overall manufacturing output.
16The model has one-sided investment, i.e., by owners of capital. If workers were also
allowed to invest in firm specific human capital, then the eﬀect of increasing the bargaining
power of workers on investment would depend upon the relative importance of firms’ and
workers’ investments in the production process.
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The third part of Proposition 2 says that overall output in manufacturing
is lower if workers in registered firms have greater bargaining power. This
stems from the fact that a firm will chose to register only if it will produce a
significantly higher amount of output to compensate for the loss in bargaining
power. Hence, on the margin, an increase in the fraction of firms that do
not register reduces manufacturing output.
Earnings of workers in the registered manufacturing sector have two com-
ponents: wage labor earnings and rents captured in the bargaining process.
In our data, we have only measures of total earnings of workers which cap-
tures both components. Thus, absent general equilibrium eﬀects on wages, it
is the rental component of earnings that responds to labor market regulation.
In terms of the theoretical model, this is:
(1− α)
Z θ
bθ(α,L) πR
³ r
α
, w; z
´
dz.
There are three eﬀects of increasing worker bargaining power which can go
in diﬀerent directions. First, a fall in α increases the eﬀective cost of capital
by exacerbating the hold-up problem. This lowers total rents. Through this
eﬀect it also reduces the size of the registered sector on the margin, and hence
also lowers rents in the registered sector. These are both bad for workers.
However, there is a first order eﬀect that increasing worker bargaining power
increases the share of any given available rents which makes workers as a
whole better oﬀ.17 In general, we expect there to be a rent maximizing value
of α strictly below one. Hence workers would not want to see all bargaining
power going to them as it reduces incentives for capital accumulation. In a
neighborhood of the optimal α, there would be no eﬀect of increasing labor
power on total labor earnings (barring general equilibrium eﬀects on wages).
The model does not embed the decision within a federal system like In-
dia’s. In reality entrepreneurs may be able to choose between registered or
unregistered sectors in a number of states. As we argued above, α is likely to
be state dependent depending on the regulatory structure in place governing
industrial relations. We view an increase in our regulatory measure as akin
to a fall in α. We might also expect other features of states (such as their
17This result generalizes to allowing workers to share in the rents in unregistered man-
ufacturing provided that their share of the rents in that sector is lower than their share in
the registered sector.
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infrastructure to govern the allocation decision). In principle, all registered
firms would want, according to the model, to migrate to the state with the
highest α. In reality, we might expect θ to contain some kind of state specific
component which gives a potential entrepreneur a comparative advantage in
remaining within a state. This could be due to cultural factors such as
speaking local languages or access to supplier networks etc. However, there
will still be a possible margin of substitution across states which can result
in firms choosing to set-up in other jurisdictions.
5 Empirical Method
The model yields predictions that can be tested empirically. For state s
and time t, there are parameters (rt, wst,αst) which vary (along with other
important factors that makes states attractive or unattractive as a place to do
business). We will suppose that the industrial relations climate is captured
by our regulatory measure discussed above which varies both at the state
level and over time.
We have direct measures of a number of the variables from the theory:
output in the registered and unregistered manufacturing sectors. We also
have measures of employment and fixed capital for the registered sector. For
the former we have a variety of diﬀerent measures from two diﬀerent data
sources. In addition, we use number of registered “factories” in a state
as a crude measure of investment. We also use data on value added per
worker. To get a handle on worker rents, we also have three sources of data
on remuneration of workers in the registered manufacturing.
We run panel data regressions of the form:
yst = αs + βt + λyst−1 + µrst + ξxst + εst
where yst is a (logged) outcome variable, rst is the regulatory measure, xst are
the exogenous variables of interest that explain the outcomes, αs is a state
fixed eﬀect and βt is a year eﬀect. We allow for robust standard errors.
We expect diﬀerences in climate and culture to be picked up in the fixed
eﬀects along with heterogeneous initial conditions. We have experimented
with a number of diﬀerent specifications and sets of control variables. In
the tables below, we use development expenditure per capita and installed
electricity capacity as our controls (the xst). The presence of a lagged
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dependent variable reflects the reasonable supposition that the patterns in
the data are aﬀected by slow moving capital stocks reflecting long range
decisions with relative immobility of capital ex post. It allows us to interpret
the parameters on the other exogenous variables as growth eﬀects.18
In the case of registered manufacturing output, employment and capital,
we expect a more pro-worker regulatory regime to be associated with lower
growth. While overall output in manufacturing will be lower, we expect it to
be higher in the unregistered sector. As well as focusing on outcome variables
that the theory predicts are aﬀected, it is also useful to check that labor
regulation in the registered manufacturing sector does not aﬀect outcomes
in other sectors where we expect it not to bite. Thus, we also estimate the
model with agricultural output as an outcome measure.
Given our rather crude quantification of the regulatory regime, it will
be important to check robustness to alternative measures. We will attempt
to diﬀerentiate pro-worker or pro-employer regulation from general activism.
Hence, we will introduce the total number amendments to the Industrial
Relations Act as a regressor, ignoring the direction of change.
A further concern is that there is some common omitted factor which is
driving both regulation and economic performance. Ideally, this would be
dealt with by instrumenting regulation. However, it is hard to find a factor
that aﬀects regulation, but which will not aﬀect economic performance di-
rectly. One intermediate way into this is to recognize that regulation (like
many policies) is an intensely political activity. The fact that the amend-
ments to the Industrial Disputes Act that we code in our data have to be
passed in the state legislatures guarantees this is the case. We thus con-
struct “political histories” for each state by looking at patterns of historical
political control by looking at episodes of majority control in the legislature.
During our data, there are five political groupings that control state legisla-
tures — hard left parties, the Congress party, Hindu parties, Janata parties
and regional parties. In each year, we created a dummy variable equal to
one if one of these groups controls the legislature. To create a history vari-
18 The presence of a lagged dependent variable in a panel with fixed eﬀects raises the
usual issue of bias. In this instance, the longish time horizon, probably means that this
is not hugely important. In each of our models, we test for autocorrelation in the errors
using a test that is robust to the existence of a lagged dependent variable. Since in
all cases, we find none, we proceeded without making any allowance for this. We also
performed the test for stationarity in panel data suggested by Madalla and Wu [1999]
which seemed to suggest no diﬃculty with assuming stationarity.
15
able, we cumulate this pattern of political control. So for example, if a state
had a Congress majority three times in the past this variable would take on
the value 3 in that state ever after. We then show that regulation is highly
correlated with this pattern of control. We then introduce them directly
into the xst vector above as regressors which might be picking a whole array
of omitted policies aﬀecting development of registered manufacturing.
6 Results
This section gives our main empirical results on the empirical links between
labor regulation and development of manufacturing in India. We begin by
looking at measures of sectoral output per capita at the state level. We
then focus more on outcomes specific to the registered manufacturing sector
— employment, labor earnings, fixed capital investment, numbers of factories
and eﬃciency. We then discuss a number of robustness checks including
diﬀerent ways of measuring regulation. Finally, we consider the possibility
that labor regulation could be proxying for other policy choices.
6.1 Basic Results
We first look at measures of output per capita in Table 2. Total state output
per capita is in column (1). The data here suggests no correlation between
output and the labor regulation regime. A negative correlation is apparent
in column (2) which looks only at non-agricultural output per capita. There
is no good reason to expect any correlation with agricultural output which is
confirmed in column (3). This result is reassuring since these regulations have
no direct eﬀect on the agricultural sector.19 Column (4) shows that the point
estimate becomes larger and more significant when looking at manufacturing
output. This is consistent with the final prediction of Proposition 2.
In column (5), we look only at registered manufacturing output and now
find an even larger and more statistically significant eﬀect. Looking at other
coeﬃcients, there is some evidence that the stock of installed electricity ca-
pacity is positively correlated with registered manufacturing. Turning to
unregistered manufacturing, we get the opposite sign — that high levels of
19This suggests that general equilibrium eﬀects which feedback on to the agricultural
sector have not been important. Given the size of the registered manufacturing sector,
this is not too surprising.
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pro-worker labor regulation encourages unregistered manufacturing. These
results make sense as the labor regulations we are looking at apply to firms
in the registered manufacturing but not to those in the unregistered manu-
facturing sector. Our findings are thus directly in line with the prediction
of Proposition 1.
The growth eﬀect of labor regulation in column (5) of Table 2 goes some
way towards explaining the diﬀerences in growth rates across the Indian
states. To illustrate this, consider Andhra Pradesh, which grew at 6 percent
per annum between 1958 and 1992. Our estimate predicts that it would have
grown at 4.1 percent had it not passed pro-employer reforms. West Bengal,
whose registered manufacturing output per capita declined at 1.5 percent
per annum over the data period would have grown at 2.2 percent, according
to the point estimate in column (5), had it not legislated in a pro-worker
direction. Thus we can explain more than two thirds of the diﬀerence in
their growth rates.
We now look at a number of performance measures within the registered
manufacturing sector. Table 3 considers four employment measures taken
from two diﬀerent sources. The data in columns (1), (2) and (3) come
from an industrial census — the Annual Survey of Industries — while that in
column (4) which is based on returns from registered manufacturing firms
comes from the Indian Labor Yearbook.20 The first variable (number of
employees) in column (1) gives the broadest definition of employment and
includes (“blue collar”) workers as well as those in supervisory or managerial
positions. Workers in column (2) are therefore a subset of employees. The
mandays variable in column (3) is defined as the total number of days worked
in a year and is a measure of gross labor input employed in the sector. Daily
employment in column (4) defined as total worker attendances over a year
divided by the total number of days worked by the factory has the advantage
that it is a measure of the intensity of labor usage. However, there is
significant variation in the fraction of firms furnishing a return which makes
20All firms in the registered manufacturing sector (i.e. those with ten or more employees
with power or with twenty or more employees without) are under the Factories Act of
1948 required to submit returns to State Chief Inspectors of Factories. Compliance with
this requirement is variable which introduces a bias into the Indian Labour Yearbook
figures. In contrast the Annual Survey of Industries covers all the firms in the registered
manufacturing sector — those with more 100 employees are completely enumerated whereas
firms with less than 100 employees are captured via stratified sampling. This implies that
ASI data is likely to more reliable, however, we include both sources as a robustness check.
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it a poor indicator of aggregate employment.
Qualitatively, all four measures tell a similar story. States which have
more pro-worker legislation have lower levels of employment. Quantitatively,
the size of this eﬀect is similar for the employee, worker and manday measures
but somewhat larger for the daily employment measure which is consistent
with there being significant reductions in intensity of labor usage.21 This
may be because part of what pro-worker labor regimes do is to prevent firms
from shedding workers.
To gauge the economic significance of these findings, Table 4 asks what
manufacturing output and employment would have been in 1990 had all
states not passed their individual amendments to the Industrial Disputes
Act (columns (1) and (2)). These take the estimated coeﬃcients in Tables
2 and 3 and use them to compute the output loss or gain in each state
over the entire period. We then express this as a ratio of actual output in
1990. By construction, this ratio is one for the control states — the numbers
for the treatment states are given in Table 4. The most extreme cases are
Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal which were (according to our measure) the
most pro-employer and pro-worker states, respectively over the period. Our
empirical model predicts that, without their pro-employer reforms, Andhra
Pradesh would have registering manufacturing output which was 84 percent
of its actual 1990 level and manufacturing employment that was 94 percent
21This can be explored as follows. Suppose that Est = θstγstLst where θst is the
fraction of firms who submit returns, γst is the intensity with which workers are used and
Lst is number of workers employed. Then the variance of employment is:
var (logEst) = ψθ + ψγ + ψL
where ψj is the variance of the log of the jth variable. Let nst be our measure of labor
regulation. Then consider how we would expect the regression coeﬃcient of logEst and
logLst on nst to vary. Denote the former by bβE and the latter as bβL. Finally let µ be
the regression coeﬃcient from regressing γst on nst. It is then easy to show that:
[βE − βL] =
ψγµ− ψLβL
ψγ + ψθ + ψL
< 0
if µ <
³
ψL
ψγ
´
βL. Thus, our results are consistent with there being significant negative
correlation between intensity of labor utilization and labor regulation.
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of its 1990 level. Had West Bengal not passed any pro-worker amendments
it would have enjoyed a registered manufacturing output that was 14 percent
higher than its 1990 level and employment that was 4 percent higher. This
comparison starkly brings out how the direction of regulatory change matters.
The output and employment eﬀects we observe are large and significant and
go some way towards explaining the variation in economic performance across
the states over this period. The fact that output falls more than employment
is indicative of firms being forced to stay open when they are no longer viable
(see Fallon and Lucas, 1993).
In Table 5, we look at the eﬀect of labor regulation on various measures
of earnings in the registered manufacturing sector. The first three measures
come from the Annual Survey of Industries and the last from Indian Labor
Yearbook data based on firm returns. In every case, there is no signifi-
cant eﬀect of regulation on payments to workers. This is significant as our
theoretical model suggested that the prediction on wages is ambiguous.
Table 6 considers measures of firm eﬃciency and investment. In columns
(1) and (2) we look at measures of valued added. These show that value
added in firms is lower in which there is more labor regulation. There is no
significant eﬀect for the log of registered manufacturing output per manday.
The next three columns (4)-(6) look at various measures of investment. The
number of factories variable comes from the list maintained by the Chief
Inspector of Factories in each state which is updated to take into account
both deregistration of firms and new entrants. It thus captures the net flow
of firms in the registered manufacturing sector. In column (4) we see that
the number of firms is significantly lower in states with more pro-worker
regulation. This suggests that pro-worker regulation is either acting as a
deterrent to new firms entering the sector (either from other states or by
growing above L) or is leading to firms dying at a higher rate. In line with
pro-worker regulation exacerbating the hold-up problem we find in column
(5) that pro-worker regulation decreases fixed capital investment, however,
we do not find that capital is adjusted significantly more than labor (column
(6)).22
Overall, these results are consistent with our simple theoretical story of
22It is also interesting to note that our measure of labor regulation is significantly pos-
itively correlated with mandays lost to strikes and lockouts. Regulating in a pro-worker
direction thus appears to be related to a deterioration in the industrial relations climate.
Visible signals like strikes and lockouts may be what deters investors from locating in
pro-worker states.
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what happens when there is an increase in the bargaining power of labor in
an incomplete contracts model.
6.2 Robustness
Our principal concern is with what our measure of regulation is capturing.
This has two components. First, whether the empirical results are robust
to the specific way that we have chosen to measure the information from
reading the amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act. Second, whether
the patterns in the data can really be attributed to labor market regulation
as opposed to some other factor which is correlated with this. We now
consider ways of dealing with these concerns.
Table 7 tries to deal with the concern that our measure of labor regula-
tion may simply be proxying for governments’ general proclivities towards
intervention in the economy. The fact that the eﬀects show up only for reg-
istered manufacturing emphasizes that any such omitted eﬀects are specific
to the registered manufacturing sector. One way of approaching this is to
recall that there are 121 amendments to the laws eﬀected over the period,
even though the results so far rely only on eighteen reform episodes to iden-
tify their eﬀects, i.e. only those that can be rated decisively as pro-worker
or pro-employer. As an alternative, we coded all of the amendments (re-
gardless of our assessment of their direction) and cumulate these over time
for each state. This gives a sense of the degree of government activism
in regulation and is denoted by the variable “total changes” in the Table.23
We then see what happens when we put in total changes and whether this
knocks out the influence of the labor regulation variable. Column (1) shows
that activist states have lower rates of growth in registered manufacturing
output. However, this eﬀect goes away when the labor regulation variable
is re-introduced into the regression (column (2)).
Looking across the remaining columns of Table 7, we find that our ac-
tivism measure contributes no statistically interesting information either by
itself or when the labor regulation variable is introduced. This confirms
the point that government activism or intrusiveness itself is not driving the
23The correlation between this cumulative change variable and labor regulation is 0.16.
Thus, there is no sense in which this simply replicates the information in the regulation
variable. States that we classified as control states have an average of 1.3 changes cum-
mulated over the period. Pro-worker states have an average of 10.7 and pro-employer
states have an average of 12.3.
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results. However the direction of the change is important.
As a further robustness check on our measure of regulation, we experiment
with a cardinalization based entirely on the rank of state’s regulatory regime
relative to its own past history.24 By construction, this has the same mean
number of regulations across each state and relies only on the qualitative
nature of each state’s own regulatory history to identify the eﬀect of labor
regulation. Thus, this deals with the concern that West Bengal, for example,
may appear as an outlier. Using this as a measure of labor regulation we
re-ran a subset of our results and report them in Table 8. The main message
of the basic results is unchanged with the pattern of significance and signs
being retained.
We now turn to the issue of whether the eﬀects are really coming from
labor regulation and not some other policy which happens to be correlated
with this. There is a whole host of potential policies which may aﬀect
the development of a state and its manufacturing base. One crude way
to proxy for this is to assemble a picture of each state’s “political history”
as measured by the number if years during our data period that particular
political groupings have held a majority of the seats in the legislature. In
our data period, the relevant groupings are: the Congress party, the Janata
parties, hard left parties and regional parties (see the data Appendix for the
exact definitions).
Column (6) of Table 9 shows that two groupings — hard left control and
Congress party control — are positively correlated with more pro-worker reg-
ulation. While it may be possible to use these political histories as in-
struments, this would be problematic if, as seems reasonable, they are also
drivers of omitted policies that aﬀect growth. Instead, we content ourselves
with including them directly in the regressions to see whether the coeﬃcient
on labor regulation remains significant. The first five columns confirm the
pattern of results found in the earlier tables. However, for output and em-
ployment, the absolute size of the coeﬃcient on labor regulation is smaller
suggesting that other omitted policies which are positively correlated with
labor regulation could also be important. Also indicative of this, a history
of political control by the hard left is negatively correlated with the growth
of registered manufacturing output. Control by the Congress party and re-
gional parties is correlated with lower wages. However, the political histories
24In creating this we count all amendments in all years. See the data appendix for
details.
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do not appear to be correlated with value added and fixed capital. Overall
these results make us sanguine that the eﬀects found here are associated with
the labor regulation regime.
7 Welfare Consequences
We turn now to the eﬀect of labor regulation on poverty. This is important
for a number of reasons, not least because it may give a sense of the where
the burden of the eﬀects identified in the last section have been felt. To
assess this, we use poverty data from Ozler, Datt and Ravallion [1996]. As
in Besley and Burgess [2000], we use a slightly diﬀerent econometric model
— GLS with a parametric correction for first order serial correlation, with a
state specific auto-correlation parameter.25
We expect the direct eﬀect on poverty to depend on the extent to which
the earnings of the poor are derived from registered manufacturing. While
we have no direct quantitative estimate of this, it is instructive to consider the
correlation between poverty rates and diﬀerent components of state output
in India. To do so, we disaggregated state output into agricultural, registered
manufacturing, unregistered manufacturing and “other” (non-agricultural/non-
manufacturing).26 We find that for urban poverty, the largest coeﬃcient is
on registered manufacturing and “other”.27 Agricultural output and un-
registered manufacturing are not significantly correlated with urban poverty.
For rural poverty, there is a significant negative correlation between unreg-
istered manufacturing and poverty and no significant correlation with regis-
tered manufacturing.
Given this pattern of correlations, our prior was that pro-worker reg-
ulation would be positively correlated with poverty in urban areas — with
an eﬀect operating through lowered registered manufacturing output and
25The results are robust to a number of alternative ways of running the model.
26Specifically, we run
pst = αs + βt + γyst + εst
where αs is a state fixed eﬀect, βt is a year eﬀect, yst is a vector of our income measures.
The regression is estimated with robust standard errors.
27We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on these two output sources are
equal.
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employment. There is no reason to expect a strong relationship with ru-
ral poverty. Table 9 shows that this is indeed the case. Regulating in a
pro-worker direction is associated with higher urban poverty for both the
headcount and the poverty gap measure (columns (1) and (2)). And from
Table 4 we know that these eﬀects on urban poverty are large — West Bengal,
example, would have had 10 percent less poverty in 1990 had it not regulated
in a pro-worker direction. In column (3) we see that, in line with our expec-
tations, there is no significant eﬀect on rural poverty. This is consistent with
the majority of registered manufacturing firms being in urban locations. In
columns (4) and (5) we run the diﬀerence between rural and urban poverty
as a left hand side variable. This helps to control for any omitted variables
(e.g. unobserved government policies) that have common eﬀects on poverty
in both places.28 We see that pro-worker regulation is associated with widen-
ing the gap between rural and urban poverty.
It is interesting to ask whether the coeﬃcients in Table 10 are consis-
tent with the entire eﬀect on poverty reduction coming through the eﬀect on
registered manufacturing output. The regression of poverty on registered
manufacturing gives a coeﬃcient of -3.8. The size of the eﬀect implied in Ta-
ble 2 is around -2.7. Hence, it does appear that the observed poverty eﬀect
may be a little larger than that implied by a pure income eﬀect. However,
the coeﬃcient lies within the 95 percent confidence interval of the two esti-
mates making them empirically indistinguishable. How exactly this eﬀect is
mediated (e.g. via labor markets etc.) is not entirely clear.
The economic significance of these eﬀects can be gauged by looking back
at Table 4 column (3) which gives an idea of what urban poverty would
have been in 1990 had states not passed pro-worker or pro-employer amend-
ments using the coeﬃcient from Table 10. Our empirical model predicts that,
without their pro-employer reforms, then Andhra Pradesh would have urban
poverty that was 110 percent of its 1990 level.29 Similarly, had West Bengal
not passed any pro-worker amendments it would have had urban poverty
that was 10 percent lower in 1990. This comparison starkly brings out how
the direction of regulatory change matters. According to our estimates, there
would have been 1.7 million more urban poor in Andra Pradesh in 1990 and
1.8 million less urban poor in West Bengal had these states not amended the
28Unlike poverty levels, it is also a variable that does not trend downwards over time.
29The employment eﬀects are larger if we use numbers of employees or workers instead
of mandays.
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Industrial Disputes Act.30
In some ways, these welfare results are the most striking of the findings.
The battle cry of labor market regulation is typically that pro-worker labor
market policies redresses the unfavorable balance of power between capital
and labor, with an undercurrent that this will have a progressive eﬀect on
income distribution. We find no evidence of this here — indeed the distribu-
tional eﬀects appear to have worked against the poor.
8 Conclusions
This paper is about the link between regulation and long-run development.
The source of identification here which allows for both time-series and cross-
sectional variation provides a credible source of evidence on this link. The
evidence amassed in the paper points to the direction of labor regulation as a
key factor in the pattern of manufacturing development in India. Regulating
in a pro-worker direction was associated with lower levels of investment,
employment, productivity and output in registered manufacturing.
The results of the paper leave little doubt that regulation of labor dis-
putes in India has had quantitatively significant eﬀects. In India, the hand
of government has been at least as important as the invisible hand in deter-
mining resource allocation. This has provoked heated debate about which
aspects of this role have constituted a brake on development. It is apparent
that much of the reasoning behind labor regulation was wrong-headed and
led to outcomes that were antithetical to their original objectives.
The paper finds little evidence that pro-worker labor market regulations
have actually promoted the interests of labor and, more worryingly, that they
have been a constraint on growth and poverty alleviation. Our results have
not been able thus far to find any gainers except for the extent to which
there may have been capital and labor flows across Indian states in response
to policy disparities as they have developed. Our finding that regulating
in a pro-worker direction was associated with increases in urban poverty are
particularly striking as they suggest that attempts to redress the balance of
power between capital and labor can end up hurting the poor.
The analysis reinforces the growing sentiment that government regula-
tions in developing countries have not always promoted social welfare. The
30The urban population of Andra Pradesh andWest Bengal were 17.15 and 18.15 million
respectively in 1990.
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example that we have studied here is highly specific and it is clear that it can-
not be used to promote a generalized pro- or anti-regulation stance. Future
progress will likely rest on improving our knowledge of specific regulatory
policies. Research involving particular country experiences will be an impor-
tant component of this. Only then can the right balance between the helping
and hindering hands of government be found.
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9 Appendix: Proofs of Results
Proof of Proposition 1: As a preliminary observe that since the pro-
duction function F (K,L) is homogeneous, the cost function can be written
as c (y; r,w) = y1/λφ (r,w) where λ < 1 is the degree of homogeneity and
φ (r, w) is increasing and concave. Then the output decision is characterized
by the condition:
θ =
1
λ
y(
1
λ−1)φ (r,w) .
Thus, output decisions map one-to-one with variations in unit costs. Let
y = h (θ/φ (r, w)) solve the above equation. We now establish three claims:
Claim 1: Define eθ ¡L¢ from h³eθ ¡L¢ /φ (r, w)´φw (r,w) = L. Then for
all θ < eθ ¡L¢, the firm will be unregistered if α < 1 (assuming that it is ac-
tive). To see this, observe that in this range: πU
¡
r, w, θ;L
¢
= πR (r, w, θ) >
απR
¡
r
α , w, θ
¢
. It is easy to check that eθ ¡L¢ is increasing in L.
Claim 2: If θ < eθ ¡L¢, then for high enough α, there exists a uniquebθ, such that all firms choose with θ > bθ choose to register. Moreover, all
firms in the registered sector produce strictly higher output than those in the
unregistered sector.
To see this, note that bθ ¡α, L¢ is defined by
πU
³
r,w,bθ;L´ = απR ³r/α, w,bθ´ . (2)
Note that (using the envelope theorem):
∂
h
απR
³
r/α, w,bθ´− πU ³r, w,bθ;L´i
∂θ
= αyR − yU .
If this is positive everywhere, then bθ is unique. Suppose then that it is not
unique and let θ0 be the lowest value of bθ. Now since θ < eθ ¡L¢, αyR − yU
has to be positive at θ0. This implies that yR > yU at θ0. We now show
that ∂[αyR−yU ]∂θ > 0. To show this observe that:
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∂ [αyR − yU ]
∂θ
= αyR
∂ log (yR)
∂θ
− yU
∂ log (yU)
∂θ
.
For fixed φ, then
∂ log(yj)
∂θ =
λ
θ(1−λ) > 0. It now suﬃces to show that
∂ log(yU )
∂θ <
λ
θ(1−λ) . To see this, define w
¡
L, yU , r
¢
from:
yUφw
¡
r,w
¡
L, yU , r
¢¢
= L
for fixed yU . This is the shadow price of labor which would make the
constraint on employing only L workers just bind (see Neary and Roberts
[1980] for discussion). Now it is easy to check that ∂w
¡
L, yU , r
¢
/∂yU > 0 and
consequently that ∂φ/∂yU > 0, i.e. it as if unregistered firms that produce
more output do so at higher unit cost because the constraint on labor hiring
bites more. Then yU solves:
θ =
1
λ
y(
1
λ−1)φ
¡
r, w
¡
L, yU , r
¢¢
.
Hence,
∂ log (yU)
∂θ
=
1
θ¡
1
λ − 1
¢
+ Ω
where Ω = ∂ logφ∂ log yU > 0 which proves the result.
Claim 3: As α → 1, θ > eθ ¡L,α¢, and all firms choose to register. This is
easy to show since φ
¡
r, w
¡
L, y, r
¢¢
> φ (r, w) for all y such that such that
w
¡
L, y, r
¢
> φ (r, w).
Together these claims prove the result. Part 1 of the Proposition follows
from Claim 1, Part 3 follows from Claim 3 and part 2 from Claim 2 after
observing that ∂bθ ¡α, L¢ /∂L = ∂πU(r,w,bθ;L)∂L · 1αyR−yU > 0 and ∂bθ ¡α, L¢ /∂α =
−∂(απR(r/α,w,
bθ))/∂α
αyR−yU < 0 which can be verified by diﬀerentiating (2) and using
the fact αyR − yU is positive at bθ. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: The first part follows from diﬀerentiating (1) and
remembering that eθ ¡L,α¢ is decreasing in α. Total manufacturing output
is:
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y
¡
r, w,α, L
¢
=
Z bθ(α,L)
θ
y
¡
r, w, z;L
¢
dz +
Z θ
bθ(α,L) y
³ r
α
, w, z
´
dz
Diﬀerentiating this with respect to α yields:
h
y
³
r, w,bθ ¡α, L¢ ;L´− y ³ r
α
, w,bθ ¡α, L¢´i ∂bθ ¡α, L¢
∂α
+
Z θ
bθ(α,L)−
r
α2
∂y
¡
r
α , w, z
¢
∂ (r/α)
dz > 0
since
h
y
³
r, w,bθ ¡α, L¢ ;L´− y ³ rα , w,bθ ¡α, L¢´i < 0 and ∂bθ(α,L)∂α < 0. QED
10 Data Appendix
The data used in the paper come from a wide variety of sources.31 They
cover the sixteen main Indian states listed in Table I and span the period
1958-1992. Haryana split from the state of Punjab in 1965. From this date
on, we include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. Variables
expressed in real terms are deflated using the Consumer Price Index for
Agricultural Laborers (CPIAL) andConsumer Price Index for Indus-
trial Workers (CPIIW). These are drawn from a number of Government of
India publications which include Indian Labor Handbook, the Indian Labor
Journal, the Indian Labor Gazette and the Reserve Bank of India Report
on Currency and Finance. Ozler, Datt and Ravallion [1996] have further
corrected CPIAL and CPIIW to take account of inter-state cost of living
diﬀerentials and have also adjusted CPIAL to take account of rising firewood
prices. The reference period for the deflator is October 1973- March 1974.
Population data used to express magnitudes in per capita terms comes
from the 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses [Census of India, Regis-
trar General and Census Commissioner, Government of India] and has been
31Our data sets builds on Ozler, Datt and Ravallion [1996] which collects published data
on poverty, output, wages, price indices and population to construct a consistent panel
data set on Indian states for the period 1958 to 1992. We are grateful to Martin Ravallion
for providing us with this data and to Guarav Datt for answering various queries. To
these data, we have added information on labor regulation, manufacturing performance,
political representation, infrastructure and public finances of Indian states.
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interpolated between census years. Separate series are available for urban
and rural areas.
The labor regulation variable comes from state specific text amend-
ments to the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 as reported in Malik [1997]. We
decided to code each change in the following way: a 1 denotes a change that
is pro-worker or anti-employer, a 0 denotes a change that we judged not to
aﬀect the bargaining power of either workers or employers and a −1 denotes
a change which we regard to be anti-worker or pro-employer. There were
121 state specific amendments which was coded in this manner. Where there
was more than one amendment in a year we collapsed this information into
a single directional measure. Thus reforms in the regulatory climate are re-
stricted to taking a value of 1, 0,−1 in any given state and year. To use these
data, we then construct cumulated variables which map the entire history
of each state beginning from 1947 — the date of enactment of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
State output comes from Estimates of State Domestic Product pub-
lished by Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of
India. Output variables are deflated and expressed in log per capita terms.
The breakdown of total output into agricultural, non-agricultural and manu-
facturing output is done under the National Industrial Classification System
(NIC) which conforms with the International Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation System (ISIC). Within manufacturing — registered manufacturing is
defined by the Factories Act of 1948 to refer to firms with ten or more em-
ployees with power or twenty or more employees without power. Unregistered
manufacturing refers to firms below these cutoﬀs and the size of this sector
is appraised by sample surveys carried out by the Department of Statistics.
Figures on employees, workers and mandays come from the Annual
Survey of Industries, Central Statistical Oﬃce (Industrial Statistics Wing),
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Programme Implemen-
tation, Government of India. Workers are defined as to include all persons
employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or not and en-
gaged in any manufacturing process or in any other kind of work incidental to
or connected to the manufacturing process. Employees includes all workers
and persons receiving wages and holding supervisory or managerial positions
engaged in administrative oﬃce, store keeping section and welfare section,
sales department as also those engaged in purchase of raw materials etc. or
purchase of fixed assets for the factory and watch and ward staﬀ. Mandays
represent the total number of days worked and not the number of days paid
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for during the accounting year. Daily employment figures are from returns
submitted from firms under the Factories Act of 1948 which have been an-
alyzed and collated in the Indian Labor Yearbook, Labor Bureau, Ministry
of Labor, Government of India. They are obtained by dividing total worker
(defined as above) attendances in a year by the number of days worked by
the factory.
Wages are defined to include all remunerations capable of being ex-
pressed in monetary terms and also payable more or less regularly in each
pay period to workers. It includes (a) direct wages and salary payments, (b)
remuneration for period not worked, (c) bonuses and ex-gratia payments paid
both at regular and at less frequent intervals. It excludes (a) lay oﬀ payments
which are made from trust or other social funds sets up expressly for this
purpose, imputed value of the benefits in kind, (b) employer’s contribution to
the old age benefits and other social security charges, direct expenditure on
maternity benefits and cre`ches and other group benefits, (c) travelling and
other expenditure incurred for the business purpose, are re-imbrued by the
employer are excluded. The wages are expressed in terms of gross value i.e.
before deduction for fines, damages, taxes, provident funds, employee’s state
insurance contribution etc. Salaries are defined in the same way as wages
but paid to all employees plus the imputed value of benefits in kind. These
come from the Annual Survey of Industries and are expressed in real terms
and per worker or per employee respectively. Annual earnings per worker
comes from the Indian Labor Yearbook and is defined as gross workers wage
bill divided by daily employment as defined above.
Value-added in the registered manufacturing sector is the increment
to the value of goods and services that is contributed by the factory and
is obtained by deducting the value of total inputs and depreciations from
the value of output. The number of factories variable comes from the
list maintained by the Chief Inspector of Factories in each state which is
updated to take into account both deregistration of firms and new entrants.
It thus captures the net flow of firms in the registered manufacturing sector.
Fixed capital represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by
the factory on the closing date of the accounting year. Fixed assets are
those which have a normal productive life of more than one year. Fixed
capital covers all types of assets new or used or own constructed, deployed for
production, transportation, living or recreational activities, hospitals, schools
etc for factory personnel. All these measures come from the Annual Survey
of Industries.
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The data on political histories comes from Butler, Lahiri and Roy
[1991]. This primary data is aggregated into four political groupings which
are defined in the text and expressed as shares of the total number of seats
in state legislatures. State political configurations are held constant be-
tween elections. Political history is measured by the number if years dur-
ing our data period that particular political groupings have held a majority
of the seats in the legislature. In our data period, the relevant groupings
are: the Congress party, the Janata parties, hard left parties and regional
parties. These groupings contain the following parties (i) Congress Party
(Indian National Congress + Indian Congress Socialist + Indian National
Congress Urs + Indian National Congress Organization), (ii) Janata parties
(Lok Dal+Janata+Janata Dal), (iii) a hard left grouping (Communist Party
of India + Communist Party of India Marxist), and a (iv) grouping made up
of regional parties.
The poverty figures we use for the rural and urban areas of India’s
16 major states, spanning 1957-58 to 1991-92 were put together by Ozler,
Datt and Ravallion [1996]. These measures are based on 22 rounds of the
National Sample Survey (NSS) which span this period. The NSS rounds
are not evenly spaced: the average interval between the midpoints of the
surveys ranges from 0.9 to 5.5 years. Surveys were carried out in the following
years 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969,
1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992. Because
other data is typically available on a yearly basis weighted interpolation has
been used to generate poverty measures for years where there was no NSS
survey. The poverty lines used are those recommended by the Planning
Commission [1993]. The headcount and poverty gap measures are estimated
from the grouped distributions of per capita expenditure published by the
NSS, using parameterized Lorenz curves using a methodology detailed in
Datt and Ravallion [1992]
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Table 1: State Economic Characteristics by Labor Regulation Status 
 
 Pro Employer Neutral Pro Worker 
Registered manufacturing 
ouput in 1960 
35   48 109*
Registered manufacturing 
output per capita in 1990 
149   132 229
Output per capita in 1960 763 822 950 
Output per capita in 1990 1380 1463 1574 
Population growth 
(percent) 
2.1   2.2 2.2
Total taxes per capita 91 93 97 
Development expenditure 
per capita 
93   112 99
Installed electrical 
capacity per capita 
0.03   0.04 0.04
Literacy rate (percent) 40 32 43 
Notes: Registered manufacturing and total output figures are expressed in real per capita terms. Population growth is the annual rate of population growth, total 
taxes refers to all central and state tax revenues allocated to a state; log development expenditure refers to expenditures by state governments on key economic 
and social services and is expressed in real per capita terms, installed electrical capacity measured in watts is expressed in per capita tems, literacy is the 
population literacy rate.  Figures for population growth, development expenditure, electricity and literacy are averages for the 1960-1990 period. The neutral 
states are Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. The pro-employer states Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu and the pro-worker states are Gujarat, Maharastra, Orissa and West Bengal.  
Table 2: Labor Regulation and Output in India: 1958-1992 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Log state
output  
  Log state 
non-ag 
output 
Log state 
ag 
outptut 
Log total 
manu 
output  
Log reg 
manu 
output  
Log unreg 
manu 
output 
Lagged dep var 0.544 0.692     0.326 0.609 0.416 0.747
    
     
    
     
       
     
    
    
     
       
       
(11.27)** (17.50)** (5.57)** (12.83)** (4.72)** (13.81)**
Labor regulation -0.003 -0.010 0.009 -0.026 -0.094 0.020
(0.60) (2.10)* (1.07) (2.84)** (5.05)** (1.99)*
Population growth -3.645 -3.528 -0.768 -2.345 3.545 -2.905
(1.97)* (1.89) (0.26) (0.83) (0.85) (0.69)
Log electricity 0.012 0.004 0.051 0.008 0.084 -0.037
(0.98) (0.47) (2.52)* (0.52) (3.13)** (1.63)
Log dev exp 0.081 0.128 0.055 0.199 0.100 0.196
(2.58)* (4.56)** (1.21) (4.41)** (1.30) (2.81)**
Observations 478 473 473 473 473 473
R-squared 0.95 0.98 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.93
Notes: Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Total, non-
agricultural, agricultural, total manufacturing, registered manufacturing and unregistered manufacturing output figures are all components of state 
domestic product and are expressed in log real per capita terms. Labor regulation captures the direction of regulatory change in a given state and year 
(1=pro-worker, 0=neutral,  -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over the period. Population growth is the annual rate of population growth, log 
electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development expenditure refers to expenditures by state governments on key 
economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms. The data are for the sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992. Haryana  
split from the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. We therefore have a total of 552 possible 
observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. 
Table 3: Labor Regulation and Employment in Registered Manufacturing in India: 1958-1992 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log employees Log workers Log mandays  Log daily 
employment 
Lagged dep var 0.603 0.690 0.780 0.614 
   
   
   
    
     
     
     
(4.28)** (9.39)** (21.40)** (6.20)**
Labor regulation -0.046 -0.032 -0.031 -0.245 
(2.74)** (2.19)* (3.96)** (3.27)**
Population growth 13.887 -2.021 7.193 -6.463 
(2.45)* (0.48) (3.41)** (0.85)
Log electricity -0.002 0.043 0.001 0.048 
(0.09) (2.08)* (0.05) (1.35)
Log dev exp 0.015 0.090 0.015 0.231 
(0.32) (1.54) (0.39) (1.62)
Observations 511 512 513 441
R-squared 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.94
Notes:  Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Employees and 
workers refer to numbers employed where the former contains those in supervisory or managerial positions in addition to workers. Mandays is defined as 
the total number of days worked in a year whereas daily employment is defined as total worker attendances over a year divided by the total number of 
days worked. All employment variables refer to the registered manufacturing sector and are expressed in log terms. Labor regulation captures the 
direction of regulatory change in a given state and year (1=pro-worker, 0=neutral,  -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over the period. Population 
growth is the annual rate of population growth, log electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development expenditure refers to 
expenditures by state governments on key economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms. The data are for the sixteen main 
states for the period 1958 - 1992. Haryana  split from the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. 
We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details on the 
construction and sources of the variables. 
Table 4: Output, Employment and Poverty Effects of Labor Regulation 
 
    (1) (2) (3)
State Manufacturing Output Manufacturing Employment Urban Headcount 
Andrha Pradesh 84% 94% 110% 
Karnataka    98% 99% 101%
Kerala    96% 99% 103%
Madhya Pradesh 96% 99% 102% 
Rajasthan    89% 96% 107%
Tamil Nadu 88% 96% 107% 
Gujarat    106% 102% 97%
Maharashtra    107% 102% 97%
Orissa    103% 101% 98%
West Bengal 114% 104% 90% 
Notes: The figures represent what manufacturing output, employment and urban poverty would have been in 1990 had states not passed any pro-labor or pro-firm 
amendments expressed as a ratio of actual figures for 1990. Results obtained by using estimated effect as predicted by the coefficient in Tables 2, 3 and 10.   We 
only present results for pro-labor and pro-firm states as the ratio for neutral states is by definition one.  Manufacturing ouptut is defined as log real registered 
manufacturing output per capita. Manufacturing employment is defined as log mandays in registered manufacturing. Poverty is defined as the proportion of the 
population beneath the urban poverty line.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Labor Regulation and Wages and Earnings in India: 1958- 1992 
     (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Log wages per 
worker 
Log salary per 
employee 
Log salary per 
manday 
Log annual earnings 
per worker 
Lagged dep var 0.642 0.281 0.367 0.356 
   
  
  
  
   
     
     
(5.83)** (3.81)** (2.78)** (5.08)**
Labor regulation -0.009 -0.006 0.008 -0.028 
(0.63) (0.35) (0.41) (1.29)
Population growth 10.065 9.037 1.336 -0.525 
(2.04)* (1.20) (0.53) (0.13)
Log electricity -0.020 -0.049 0.007 -0.019 
(0.95) (0.94) (0.27) (0.87)
Log dev exp -0.006 0.199 0.149 0.176 
(0.09) (3.54)** (3.12)** (2.48)*
Observations 509 507 507 443
R-squared 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.69
Notes:  Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Wages refers to all 
remunerations payable to workers whereas salaries refers to renumerations payable to employees. Annual earnings per worker is defined as the gross workers 
wage bill divided by daily employment. All earning figures are expressed in real log terms. Labor regulation captures the direction of regulatory change in a 
given state and year (1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over the period. Population growth is the annual rate of population 
growth, log electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development expenditure refers to expenditures by state governments on key 
economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms. The data are for the sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992. Haryana  split from 
the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. 
Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. 
 
Table 6: Labor Regulation and Efficiency and Investment in Registered Manufacturing in India: 1958- 1992 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log value
added per 
employee 
  Log value 
added per 
manday 
Log reg 
manu 
income per 
manday 
Log 
factories per 
capita 
Log fixed 
capital  
Log capital 
labour ratio 
Lagged dep var 0.312      0.426 0.331 0.720 0.539 0.569
 (3.34)** (4.04)** (3.99)** (8.90)**   
    
   
     
  
     
   
    
    
       
       
(5.38)** (5.16)**
Labor regulation 
 
-0.083 -0.048 -0.016 -0.104 -0.067 -0.006
(4.03)** (2.23)* (1.43) (2.42)* (2.23)* (0.27)
Pop growth -0.041 0.023 0.058 -0.008 0.091 0.055
(0.60) (0.50) (2.69)** (0.38) (1.81) (1.06)
Log electricity 
 
0.334 0.264 0.182 0.175 0.310 0.316
(3.44)** (2.74)** (2.45)* (1.93) (2.01)* (1.95)
Log dev exp 1.829 -4.458 -9.730 1.034 23.998 9.366
(0.18) (0.84) (2.43)* (0.19) (2.86)** (1.35)
Observations 400 400 473 443 352 352
R-squared 0.73 0.69 0.80 0.95 0.96 0.83
Notes:  Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Value-added in the 
registered manufacturing sector is the increment to the value of goods and services that is contributed by the factory and is obtained by deducting the value of 
total inputs and depreciations from the value of output. The number of factories refers to the number in the registered manufacturing sector in each state where 
adjustments are made for deregistration and new entrants. Fixed capital represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by the factory on the closing date 
of the accounting year. The capital labour ratio is given by dividing fixed capital by mandays. All efficiency investment variables are expressed in real log terms. 
Labor regulation captures the direction of regulatory change in a given state and year (1=pro-worker, 0=neutral,  -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over 
the period. Population growth is the annual rate of population growth, log electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development 
expenditure refers to expenditures by state governments on key economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms. The data are for the 
sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992. Haryana  split from the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and 
Haryana. We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details on 
the construction and sources of the variables. 
Table 7: Checking Robustness to Introducing Aggregate Number of Regulatory Changes 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8)
 Log reg
manu 
output per 
capita 
  Log reg 
manu 
output per 
capita 
Log 
mandays 
Log 
mandays 
Log value 
added per 
worker 
Log value 
added per 
worker 
Log fixed 
capital 
Log fixed 
capital 
Lag dep var 0.467 0.414 0.806      0.780 0.332 0.304 0.557 0.537
 (5.11)**
 
        
    
        
     
    
        
        
        
        
      
        
       
         
(4.70)** (24.12)**
 
(21.49)**
 
(3.45)**
 
(3.22)** (5.85)**
 
(5.34)**
Labor regul
 
-0.084 -0.034 -0.096 -0.076
(4.22)** (3.68)**
 
(3.83)** (2.24)*
Total changes 
 
-0.011 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.006
(3.20)**
 
 (1.21) (0.93) (0.89) (0.02) (1.58) (0.32) (1.30)
Pop growth
 
3.014 3.684 6.808 7.121 4.005 1.792 25.253 24.126
(0.70) (0.88) (3.19)**
 
(3.39)** (0.39) (0.18) (2.85)** (2.87)**
Log electricity
 
0.108 0.088 0.007 -0.000 -0.017 -0.046 0.106 0.087
(3.33)** (3.13)** (0.46) (0.03) (0.26) (0.66) (2.18)* (1.70)
Log dev exp 
 
0.074 0.093 0.013 0.015 0.308 0.329 0.283 0.304
(0.87) (1.19) (0.36) (0.40) (3.17)**
 
(3.45)**
 
(1.90) (2.00)*
Observations 473 473 513 513 400 400 352 352
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.72 0.73 0.96 0.96
Notes:  Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Output is defined in log 
real per capita terms. Mandays is defined as the total number of days worked in a year and is expressed in log terms. Value-added is the increment to the value of 
goods and services and is obtained by deducting the value of total inputs and depreciations from the value of output. Fixed capital represents the depreciated 
value of fixed assets owned by the factory on the closing date of the accounting year. All these variables are for the registered manufacturing sector. Total 
changes refers to the total number of state level legislative changes made to the Industrial Disputes Act. Labor regulation captures the direction of regulatory 
change in a given state and year (1=pro-worker, 0=neutral,  -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over the period. Population growth is the annual rate of 
population growth, log electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development expenditure refers to expenditures by state governments 
on key economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms. The data are for the sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992. Haryana 
split from the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. We therefore have a total of 552 possible 
observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. 
Table 8:  Checking Robustness to Introducing Within Year State Rank 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5)
 Log reg
manu 
output 
  Log mandays Log salary per 
manday 
Log value added 
per employee 
Log fixed 
capital  
Lagged dep var 0.475 0.802    0.368 0.312 0.543
 (5.13)** (23.40)** (2.79)**   
     
  
    
  
  
      
      
(3.34)** (5.50)**
Within year state rank -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 
(2.68)** (2.19)* (0.26) (3.75)** (2.14)*
Pop growth 3.332 6.985 1.234 2.822 24.763 
(0.76) (3.29)** (0.50) (0.28) (2.89)**
Log electricity 
 
0.103 0.006 0.005 -0.031 0.099
(3.33)** (0.39) (0.17) (0.45) (2.03)*
Log dev exp 0.094 0.014 0.149 0.325 0.300 
(1.14) (0.38) (3.11)** (3.36)** (1.97)
Observations 473 513 507 400 352
R-squared 0.96 0.99 0.79 0.73 0.96
Notes: Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Output is defined in log 
real per capita terms. Mandays is defined as the total number of days worked in a year and is expressed in log terms. Value-added is the increment to the value of 
goods and services and is obtained by deducting the value of total inputs and depreciations from the value of output. Fixed capital represents the depreciated 
value of fixed assets owned by the factory on the closing date of the accounting year. All these variables are for the registered manufacturing sector. Labor 
regulation captures the direction of regulatory change in a given state and year (1=pro-worker, 0=neutral,  -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over the 
period. Population growth is the annual rate of population growth, log electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development 
expenditure refers to expenditures by state governments on key economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms. The data are for the 
sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992. Haryana  split from the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and 
Haryana. We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details on 
the construction and sources of the variables. 
 
Table 9: Checking Robustness to Inclusion of Political Histories 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Log reg manu 
output 
Log mandays Log salary per 
manday 
Log value 
added  per 
employee 
Log fixed 
capital  
Labor regulation  
Lagged dep var 0.379 0.770     0.307 0.308 0.535
 (4.54)** (20.57)** (2.31)* (3.27)** (5.36)**  
     
      
     
   
     
      
     
   
    
      
      
  
       
       
Labor regulation 
 
-0.056 -0.023 -0.013 -0.089 -0.060
(3.05)** (2.37)* (0.94) (3.41)** (1.82)
Pop growth 4.077 7.068 2.648 2.896 25.677
(0.97) (3.22)** (1.09) (0.28) (2.90)**
Log electricity 
 
0.080 -0.003 0.004 -0.033 0.107
(2.82)** (0.21) (0.18) (0.48) (1.92)
Log dev exp 0.071 0.014 0.197 0.335 0.320
(0.91) (0.36) (3.46)** (3.22)** (2.02)*
Congress majority 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 0.041    
 (0.19) (0.37) (2.72)** (0.04) (0.56) (4.58)**   
Janata majority 
 
-0.005 0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.016 -0.017
(0.52) (1.20) (1.37) (0.59) (0.89) (-0.82)
Hard left majority 
 
-0.032 -0.006 0.004 0.011 -0.002 0.226    
(3.45)** (1.45) (0.52) (1.11) (0.16) (9.46)**
Regional majority 
 
0.004 -0.001 -0.016 0.002 0.002 -0.005   
(0.88) (0.36) (3.62)** (0.31) (0.29) (-0.53)
Observations 473 513 507 400 352 513
R-squared 0.96 0.99 0.80 0.73 0.96 0.73
Notes:  Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Output is defined in log real per capita terms. Mandays is 
defined as the total number of days worked in a year and is expressed in log terms. Value-added is the increment to the value of goods and services and is obtained by deducting the value of total inputs 
and depreciations from the value of output. Fixed capital represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by the factory on the closing date of the accounting year. All these variables are for the 
registered manufacturing sector. Labor regulation captures the direction of regulatory change in a given state and year (1=pro-worker, 0=neutral,  -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over the 
period. Population growth is the annual rate of population growth, log electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development expenditure refers to expenditures by state 
governments on key economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms. Political history is measured by the number if years during our data period that particular political 
groupings have held a majority of the seats in the state legislatures. The data are for the sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992. Haryana  split from the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we 
include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details 
on the construction and sources of the variables. 
        Table 10: Labor Regulation and Poverty in India: 1958-1992 
   (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5)
 Urban
headcount 
 Urban 
poverty gap 
Rural 
poverty gap 
Rural-urban 
poverty gap 
difference 
Rural-urban 
headcount 
difference 
    GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
Labor regulation      1.815 0.550 0.020 -0.548 -2.266
      
    
      
      
      
       
      
      
(4.97)** (2.85)** (0.07) (1.83) (3.60)**
Population growth -197.176 -179.161 -269.790 -89.197 -54.597
(1.73) (3.10)** (3.40)** (1.21) (0.32)
Log electricity 0.756 0.360 0.051 -0.325 -0.773
(1.39) (1.66) (0.19) (1.13) (1.03)
Log dev exp 3.259 0.594 1.012 0.511 -1.608
(2.26)* (0.97) (1.25) (0.58) (0.75)
Observations 513 513 513 513 513
Notes: Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Poverty measures 
in other regressions have been interpolated between survey years. In columns (4) the poverty gap difference is the difference between the rural and urban 
poverty gap measures for each state. In column (5), the headcount difference is the difference between the rural and urban headcount index for each state.  
See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for the sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992. 
Haryana  split from the Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. We therefore have a total of 552 
possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. Labor regulation captures the direction of regulatory change in a given 
state and year (1=pro-worker, 0=neutral,  -1=pro-employer) and has been cumulated over the period. Population growth is the annual rate of population 
growth, log electricity is log installed electrical capacity measured in watts, log development expenditure refers to expenditures by state governments on 
key economic and social services and is expressed in real log per capita terms.  
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Figure 1: Labour Regulation in India: 1958-1992
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Figure 2: Registered Manufacturing Output Per Capita: 1958-1992
year
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Figure 3: Registered Manufacturing Employment: 1958-1992
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